In his new introduction to this current edition of this classic in the field originally published in 1982 (Humanities Press), Hoppe (economics, U. of Nevada, Las Vegas--as was the late author) extols Rothbard's marriage of the "value-free" science of economics with the normative enterprise of ethics and their offspring: libertarianism. Discussion areas are: natural law, a theory of liberty, the state vs. liberty, modern alternative theories of liberty, and toward a theory of strategy for liberty. Annotation copyrighted by Book (...) News, Inc., Portland, OR. (shrink)

The libertarian-individualist cause is at a critical crossroads. To have a successful revolution in the minds of men, we must learn from the Leninists what “revolutionaries” can do to advance their principles: nourish and increase the hard core with an “open center” and support specific political actions through auxiliary organizations, while avoiding “left-wing opportunism” and “right-wing sectarianism.” Historically, it was from the post-war libertarian outposts that FEE was able to build and galvanize such a hard core open center, with members (...) even radicalizing one another. But FEE attempted to be more populist than scholarly, driving away scholars once they had “graduated.” The Volker Fund filled this gap to some extent; but has started to go the way of the Earheart foundation’s efforts—since the scholars selected were not radical enough to maintain an open center, the hard core has been weakening and dissolving. The libertarian cause should de-emphasize drastically popular fronts with the conservative right, it should nourish and construct the hardcore libertarian movement with some form or forms of nucleus or center, and it must emphasize libertarian scholars and intellectuals primarily. (shrink)

attempt to justify the State, or at least a minimal State confined to the functions of protection. Beginning with a free-market anarchist state of nature, Nozick portrays the State as emerging, by an invisible hand process that violates no one’s rights, first as a dominant protective agency, then to an "ultra-minimal state," and then finally to a minimal state. Before embarking on a detailed critique of the various Nozickian stages, let us consider several grave fallacies in Nozick’s conception itself, each (...) of which would in itself be sufficient.. (shrink)

Murray N. Rothbard (1926–1995) was dean of the Austrian School. He was an economist, economic historian, and libertarian political philosopher. See Murray N. Rothbard's article archives. This article is excerpted from An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought, vol. 1, Economic Thought Before Adam Smith (1995).

(2012). Murray Rothbard: Major Conservative and Libertarian Thinkers series, Volume 15. International Journal of Philosophical Studies: Vol. 20, No. 4, pp. 584-589.

On Black Friday, March 27, 1981, at 9:00 A.M. in San Francisco, the “libertarian” power elite of the Cato Institute, consisting of President Edward H. Crane III and Other Shareholder Charles G. Koc...

Murray Rothbard's Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought demonstrates his mastery of the literature. But his interpretation of the development of economics reflects, and is therefore severely limited by, his Austrian‐libertarian perspective. Indeed, Rothbard appropriates the history of economic thought principally to advance his perspective, as seen in his neglect of social control, his identification of his desired economic system with the natural order of things, and especially in his denigratory treatment of Adam Smith—at bottom (...) for not being an Austrian economist and a true libertarian. A partly informed, partly myopic and sometimes useful interpretation, this is the work of an ideologue. (shrink)

This paper is a presentation and an interpretation of Murray Rothbard’s views on the relation between the fiscal necessities brought by war and interventionism in Money and Banking as read from his book A History of Money and Banking in the United States.

Austrian economics emphasizes a priori components of social scientific theory. Most emphatically, Ludwig Mises and Murray Rothbard champion praxeology, a methodology often criticized as extremely aprioristic. Among the numerous justifications and interpretations of praxeology to be found in the primary and secondary literature, conventionalism avoids the charge of extreme apriorism by construing the fundamental axiom of praxeology as analytic instead of synthetic. This paper (1) explicates the tentative structure of the fundamental axiom, (2) clarifies some aspects of a (...) conventionalist defense of praxeology, and (3) appraises conventionalist praxeology according to Rothbardian criteria. While Rothbard provides an essentialist justification of praxeology and embraces extreme apriorism, a mildly aprioristic conventionalist defense of praxeology fares better on Rothbard’s own criteria and is much more compatible with other contemporary methodological positions and economic theories. (shrink)

Austrian economics emphasizes a priori components of social scientific theory. Most emphatically, Ludwig Mises and Murray Rothbard champion praxeology, a methodology often criticized as extremely aprioristic. Among the numerous justifications and interpretations of praxeology to be found in the primary and secondary literature, conventionalism avoids the charge of extreme apriorism by construing the fundamental axiom of praxeology as analytic instead of synthetic. This paper (1) explicates the tentative structure of the fundamental axiom, (2) clarifies some aspects of a (...) conventionalist defense of praxeology, and (3) appraises conventionalist praxeology according to Rothbardian criteria. While Rothbard provides an essentialist justification of praxeology and embraces extreme apriorism, a mildly aprioristic conventionalist defense of praxeology fares better on Rothbard’s own criteria and is much more compatible with other contemporary methodological positions and economic theories. (shrink)

This paper critiques Rothbard’s concept of gross investment. Rothbard introduced the concept in order to demonstrate his point that it is not consumer spending that primarily drives the economy, like the mainstream Keynesian view maintains, but the capitalists’ spending. In this paper, it is argued that, contrary to Rothbard’s opinion, the amount of gross investment as he defines it does not contain significant information concerning the question as to whether the capital structure of a society can be (...) upheld or not. Instead, it is an arbitrary figure that depends on the length of the different stages of production. This problem has not been recognized by Rothbard because his exposition rests upon the assumption of an equal time length for all stages. Apparently, he has been led astray by his intention to find arguments against the importance of consumer spending in the determination of output. (shrink)

On the grounds of the libertarian ethics presented by Murray N. Rothbard, the state is an institution which acts against individuals and whole societies. The state steals money from its citizens (taxes), stands in the way of free market development and controls the economy, thus hindering entrepreneurship. Besides that, the state – through its rules and regulations – limits every man's right to make moral choices. The state is an immoral institution, therefore its citizens have the right to (...) refuse to pay taxes, follow orders, and even – in some circumstances – corrupt civil servants. In this paper we analyse Rothbard’s ethics and look into the arguments of critics of libertarian thought. Practical social and economic solutions that emerge from Rothbard’s point of view are also considered. (shrink)

Murray Rothbard claims that it is “evident that our theory of proportional punishment—that people may be punished by losing their rights to the extent that they have invaded the rights of others—is frankly a retributive theory of punishment, a ‘tooth (or two teeth) for a tooth’ theory.” The present paper argues that it is not. The role that Rothbard assigns for victims in determining punishment justifies classifying his theory of punishment as corrective rather than retributive, for vesting (...) victims with rights over punishment defeats the retributive justice requirement that criminals are punished solely because they deserve it and in accordance with their respective deserts. Instead of giving offenders what they objectively deserve, the Rothbardian theory of punishment allows victims to seek compensation in various forms, including revenge. (shrink)

In “Rothbard as a philosopher” Edward Feser harshly criticises the philosophical abilities of Murray Rothbard. According to Feser, Rothbard seems unable to produce arguments that don’t commit obvious fallacies or produces arguments that fail to address certain obvious objections. His criticism centres on what he regards as Rothbard’s principal argument for the thesis of self-ownership. In this paper, I attempt to show that Feser’s criticism fails of its purpose and that Rothbard is very far (...) from being the epitome of philosophical ineptitude that Feser takes him to be. (shrink)

Autor v tomto článku rozporuje pojem non-agrese Murrayho N. Rothbarda a využívá při tom to, co nazývá paradoxem non-agresivní vraždy. Autorovou ambicí není nic menšího než rozbít základy Rothbardovy politické filosofie a využívá přitom důkaz sporem, tedy fakt, že vyvrácení kontradiktorního opaku jako nepravdivého je za podmínek úplné disjunkce zároveň důkazem pravdivosti dokazované teze. Dokazovanou tezí je zde teze: v určitých případech existují pozitivní práva a povinnosti, tedy práva a povinnosti nevyplývající ani ze smlouvy, ani z předešlé agrese. O této (...) skupině práv a povinností však Rothbard říká, že ve skutečnosti neexistuje. Důvodem dle Rothbarda je, že takováto pozitivní práva a povinnosti by porušovaly sebevlastnictví povinovaného, resp. jeho právo k vlastní osobě a majetku. Autor tohoto článku naopak jejich existenci dokazuje poukazem na nepravdivost kontradiktorního opaku („pozitivní práva nikdy neexistují“), kterou ukazuje na uvedených paradoxech obklíčitele, majitele člunu, hostitele a skokana. Určité konkrétní majetkové právo nemůže mít subjekt A i subjekt B současně a ve stejném rozsahu. Zatímco však Rothbard tvrdí, že majetkové právo může vyplývat pouze ze smlouvy či z předchozí agrese (jako právo na kompenzaci), autor tohoto článku argumentuje, že majetkové právo nemusí vyplývat pouze ze smlouvy či z předchozí agrese, a dokazuje to existencí případů, kdy popření mimo-smluvního majetkového práva implikuje paradox non-agresivní vraždy: subjekt, který naplánuje úkladnou vraždu, se nedopouští protiprávní agrese. Což je rozpor. Ergo, teze „pozitivní práva nikdy neexistují“ je nepravdivá. Ergo, pravdivá je autorem dokazovaná teze. Mimo-smluvní práva a povinnosti se tedy nachází v obsahu správně pojatého pojmu sebevlastnictví a úkladná vražda se nikdy nenachází v rozsahu správně pojatého pojmu non-agrese. (shrink)

This paper examines rights and the protection of rights from both the minarchist and the anarchist perspectives. The former relies on Objectivist perspectives and the latter relies primarily on Murray Rothbard’s views. My view is that government protection as put forth by Objectivists is coercive, as are all methods of financing. However, under anarcho-capitalism, children who have been killed or abused by their caregivers do not have equal protection under the law. The principle of equal protection is one (...) with which both Objectivists and Rothbard agree. A case is made for government protection of rights under those circumstances. In addition, a case is made for positive rights to parental care for children, and also for government protection of those rights if they have been violated by their caregivers. I also argue for government oversight in instances when the rights of children have been violated and as a consequence the children have no alternative means of care. (shrink)

Murray N. Rothbard and Hans-Hermann Hoppe build their libertarian theory of justice on two axioms concerning self-ownership and homesteading, which are bolstered by two key arguments: reductio ad absurdum and performative contradiction. Each of these arguments is designed to demonstrate that libertarianism is the only theory of justice that can be justified. If either of these arguments were valid, it would prove the libertarian claim that the state is an unjust political arrangement. Giving due weight to the importance (...) of the libertarian anarchist claim, this article exposes and criticizes the arguments that substantiate it. (shrink)

The present paper aims to study the issue of the value of life in Murray N. Rothbard’s work, and to examine his argument for the contention that “life _should_ be an objective ultimate value” and that “the preservation and furtherance of one’s life takes on the stature of an incontestable axiom.” Rothbard’s assumptions and presuppositions are investigated and critically assessed. Using conceptual and logical analysis rooted mostly in the praxeological method of economics (as developed by Mises and (...) Rothbard himself) and the theory of value (Scheffler, Raz, Elzenberg), it is demonstrated that Rothbard’s account is fallacious both on its own as well as on broader theoretical grounds. It is argued that what Rothbard could—under his specific assumptions about valuing—correctly claim is only that an actor values life _to some extent_, rather than that life has an objective ultimate value or preservation and furtherance of one’s life has an axiomatic status. The theoretical argument is supported by empirical illustration from suicide terrorism. The paper submits that Rothbard’s position on the value of life is unsound, and that using his argumentation as it stands cannot succeed. (shrink)

The present paper argues that Rothbard’s economic case against the state is more robust than suggested by his critics. The charge that it might be anemic is based on the suggestion that we can say literally nothing about the way governmental acts bear on social utility. Contra this supposition we submit that Rothbard’s critics missed the fact that the effects of governmental interventions might be actually indeterminate in two ways: weakly or strongly. If the indeterminacy involved in his (...) welfare theory is weak, then his economic criticism of the state is more robust than envisaged by these authors. To the effect that this indeterminacy is indeed weak we advance the following reasons: Rothbard’s understanding of the Unanimity Rule; the avoidance of the contradiction allegedly committed by Rothbard over one and the same page of his famous essay; his economic criticism of interventionism being better aligned with his overall ethical anti-governmental stance; the principle of charitable reading, which cuts across all of the previously stated reasons. If our arguments count for something, then we are warranted in claiming that Rothbard is indeed able to say something about social utility under interventionism. And if so, then his criticism of interventionism should be viewed as robust rather than anemic. (shrink)

The root of any system of economic theory is the theory of price. But while modern Austrian economists have put a great deal of effort and ingenuity into building up the superstructure of their discipline since the mid-1970s, they have paid scant attention to ensuring that the price theory supporting the edifice is a sound and settled doctrine. The result is that, for many current Austrians, price theory is a “dynamic” version of neoclassical price theory. More precisely, it is Chicago (...) price theory with a theory of entrepreneurship and of competition as a rivalrous process grafted onto it. This ad hoc approach to Austrian price theory thus relies heavily on the analytical tools and techniques developed by Alfred Marshall, Frank Knight, and Jacob Viner. George Stigler later elaborated these individual contributions into a systematic price theory.The prevailing approach almost completely ignores the fact that there exists an alternative “causal-realist” tradition of price theory that was founded by Carl Menger and developed by his followers both in Austria and abroad. These include especially Böhm-Bawerk, J.B. Clark, Frank Fetter, Herbert Davenport, Philip Wicksteed, and Ludwig von Mises. The causal-realist tradition, which is explicitly anti-Marshallian and anti-Stiglerian, maintained a shadowy presence in Austrian economics for most of the postwar period. It is only in recent years that some Austrian economists, seeking a sound price theory to sure up the foundations of their discipline, have explicitly recognized and embraced it.Israel M. Kirzner’s neglected book, Market Theory and the Price System, which was first published in 1963 and reprinted in a new edition this year, was the first and only systematic attempt to marry Stiglerian price theory with elements of the causal-realist tradition. Murray N. Rothbard, who had already reformulated and significantly advanced the causal-realist tradition in his own treatise Man, Economy, and State, wrote a comprehensive and quite critical referee report on Kirzner’s book manuscript for the publisher in 1961. His comments have never been published before.This article contains two parts. The first part is a response to certain claims and omissions made by Peter J. Boettke and Frédéric Sautet, the editors of the new edition of Kirzner’s book. The second part contains Rothbard’s report on the book as a supporting document for the arguments of the first part. By proceeding in this way the goal is to clarify the important issues at stake for Austrian price theory. (shrink)

Murray Rothbard, in his The Ethics of Liberty, attempts to derive property ownership from the act of homesteading. Under this system, property is claimed through the act of mixing one’s labor with it. However, the theory of homesteading as a means for property rights formation is one that favors production over consumption and denies the subjectivity of value.